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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Refer to: I-16715/61

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SEP 27 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Briefing Notes for Your Paris Discussions

In accordance with your request to Secretary McNamara, the attached briefing notes have been prepared for your visit to Paris. We understand that you plan to meet with Ambassadors Gavin and Finletter, and Generals Morstad or C. D. Palmer.

As you know, many actions relating to the Berlin crisis are currently in progress at USRO and SHAPE. We believe it would be very useful and informative for you to solicit the views of Ambassador Finletter and Generals Morstad or Palmer, as senior U.S. officials concerned, regarding the adequacy and timeliness of the measures being taken by the U.S., and those taken or announced by our Allies.

Listed below are the topics which in our judgment would be appropriate for your discussions. Briefing notes supporting each item appear at the corresponding tab. These papers have been coordinated with the Department of State.

Effect of the Berlin Crisis on NATO Cohesion (Tab A)  
Facilities for Building of U.S. Forces in Europe (Tab B)  
NATO Country Building to Meet Berlin Crisis (Tab C)  
Emergency Authority to Stockpile Atomic Weapons in France (Tab D)

Paul H. Nitze  
Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)

4 Attachments  
a/s

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Authority OSD Ltr 11/8/76  
By RMG, NARS, Date 3/31/77

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VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO PARIS

29-30 September 1961

Effect of Berlin Crisis on NATO Cohesion

Berlin activities by the 4-Powers are testing NATO cohesion. Crises have always before tended to unify NATO, but there have been several adverse NAC and NATO reactions to recent quadripartite steps. Steps now in process to bring the whole Alliance much more fully into Berlin contingency planning will, it is hoped, improve the atmosphere and elicit NATO-wide support for the Berlin program. The Powers with direct responsibility in Berlin cannot afford a small-power veto in the early stages, yet the lesser powers insist on fuller participation in planning that can well determine how and when they go to war. The controversies over the role of nuclear weapons in the Berlin conflict can also affect NATO cohesion. Means of avoiding or reducing disunifying effects are urgently important.

Prepared by: Colonel D. G. Armstrong, XII  
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27 September 1961

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VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO PARIS  
29-30 September 1961

Facilities for Buildup of US Forces in Europe

Discussions are proceeding between USCINCEUR and responsible authorities of Germany, France, Italy, U.K. and Belgium concerning the availability of facilities and Line of Communication support which would be required for the deployment of up to six U.S. divisions and 28 tactical air squadrons if required in the light of the Berlin crisis. To date CINCEUR has reported no substantive issues having been raised by host state authorities and excellent progress is being made; however, the availability of land areas in France and Germany is considered by the Department of Defense as a potential problem.

The contingency planning being undertaken by USCINCEUR is based upon the possible deployment of up to six divisions to the Seventh Army area in the FRG, seven tactical air squadrons and one air transport squadron to the FRG, 19 tactical squadrons and one air transport squadron to France and one tactical squadron each to the U.K. and Italy.

Prepared by: W. E. Lang  
Foreign Military Rights  
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26 September 1961

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VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO PARIS  
29-30 September 1961

NATO Country Buildup to Meet Berlin Crisis

In a presentation to the North Atlantic Council on 6 August, Secretary Rusk called upon member nations to increase their posture of military readiness to meet the Berlin threat by measures comparable to those taken by the U.S. On 19 August, SACER prepared his "Plan of Action: NATO Europe" (SHAPE 167/61), spelling out recommended country actions in detail. This plan envisioned two phases: measures which would produce positive results prior to 1 January 1962, and those which, under emergency conditions, could produce results during 1962. They included the raising of manning and equipment levels of existing combat units, making available to ACE additional combat units, increasing the number and capability of combat and Service support units, and improving the posture of reserve units.

Country response to date, while uneven, has been encouraging. Fulfillment of commitments stated in the country replies will result in a significantly increased capability of Allied Command Europe forces, particularly in the vital Central Shield area. The existing 21-2/3 divisions in that area will be increased to 24-1/3 by 1 January 1962, and most of these will have a high combat potential. This is in contrast to their capability on 15 September 1961 of "scarcely more than that of 16 fully ready divisions." Country replies also indicate that a strategic reserve of 12-5/3 divisions will be available outside Continental Europe and, depending upon improved transportation and logistic support, can make a substantial contribution. Similarly, the air strength of the Central area will be augmented by the addition of 255 aircraft by 1 January 1962 and of at least 177 more during 1962. In the Northern Region, the responses of Norway and Denmark have been positive, but the financial capability of these nations is so limited that their efforts will necessarily fall short of the desired goals and the defense of this critical area remains uncertain.

NATO country responses to the SACER requirements have varied from none in the case of Portugal to good in the case of Canada and the Netherlands. The United Kingdom, French and German responses have been somewhat less than expected of these leading NATO members. Detailed replies and DoD comments are tabulated in separate briefing material. The nature of these responses suggests two issues that deserve early decision:

- (1) How hard should the U.S. press for country compliance with General Horstad's "Plan of Action: NATO Europe" in the face of country unwillingness to increase manning levels or make adequate budgetary provision for its force buildup?

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(2) To what extent should the U.S. be prepared to provide military assistance in support of country actions?

In the case of Greece and Turkey, country compliance will be dependent upon further U.S. aid, both in the form of MAP and supporting assistance. MAP for other NATO countries is presently limited to fulfillment of prior commitments and training. This policy is clearly applicable to the Central countries and Italy, but there is good reason to believe that Norway and Denmark do not possess the financial resources to meet their buildup requirements without some relaxation of present MAP limitations.

The Vice President might solicit comment on the NATO buildup from General C. B. Palmer and Ambassador Vinletter.

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27 September 1961

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VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO PARIS  
29-30 September 1961

Emergency Authority to Stockpile Atomic Weapons in France


France has never permitted the storage of U.S. nuclear weapons on her soil. In mid-1959, due to the impending Berlin crisis, SACHEP directed the redeployment of U.S. nuclear delivery aircraft from French bases to other airbases in Germany and U.K. in order to base delivery vehicles in proximity to nuclear weapons. Subsequently, certain French bases have been largely on a standby basis, whereas our bases in Germany and U.K. have an over-concentration of planes, resulting in increased vulnerability to enemy attack.

Under our base rights agreement with France, the U.S. retains the right to deploy conventionally armed aircraft to the northern French bases. Under current USAF Tactical Air Command plans, a number of squadrons of aircraft including F-104s and F-100s may be deployed in a conventional configuration to these bases, but all would be capable of nuclear strikes if the need should arise and if nuclear weapons were available.

For this reason, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended that France "authorize the U.S. to stockpile atomic weapons in France" and General Horstad has indicated that "consideration should be given . . . to granting authority to stockpile atomic weapons in France on an emergency basis." If the French would approve such a move for the duration of the Berlin crisis, considerable flexibility in the dispersion of in-theater forces would result and units deployed from the U.S. to northern France would have both a conventional and atomic capability if the need should arise. Vulnerability would also be decreased due to greater dispersion.

Recommendation. It is suggested that the possibility of French acquiescence to the emergency storage of nuclear weapons on French soil for the duration of the Berlin crisis be explored with General Palmer and Ambassadors Fioletter and Gavin. A clear understanding of their views would be most helpful in reaching a decision here in Washington as to the wisdom of approaching General de Gaulle on this matter.

Prepared by: Colonel B. K. Yount  
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27 September 1961



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